Practice-based perspectives in information systems have established how, in every instance of use (i.e., work practices), the user exercises considerable discretion in their appropriation of the technology with local workarounds and situated improvisations. We analyse the relationship between technologically mediated work practices separated in time and space. Specifically, we analyse how similarity in work practices is achieved. Achieving absolutely similar (or 'best') practices is unattainable. Drawing on a longitudinal (2007 -2011) case of ambulatory maintenance work in the oil and gas sector, we identify and discuss three constituting strategies (differentiation, assembling and punctuation) through which a family resemblance of -similar but not the same -work practices is crafted. We discuss how, in the absence of an essentialist criterion, similarity is subject to pragmatic but also political negotiations.
Introduction
Users exercise considerable discretion when appropriating technology. Empirical studies have consistently and convincingly demonstrated how information systems routinely, arguably even necessarily, are subject to workarounds, improvisations and tinkering (Gasser, 1986) . That every instance of users' interaction with technology is enacted (Orlikowski, 2000) , situated (Suchman, 2007) , a bricolage (Orr 1996) , improvised (Orlikowski, 1996) and contextual (Robey & Sahay, 1996) is well rehearsed in information systems research. 2 There is, however, a relative scarcity of accounts of the relationship between time-space separated instances of user's interactions (i.e. work practices). In particular, we lack a robust understanding of how the 'same' work practices emerge over time and space (Leonardi & Barley 2008) . In an increasingly globalised world, establishing uniform work practices is vital for competitiveness of business organisations (Leidner 1993) . The group of engineers engaged in the maintenance of oil and gas wells we study is under mounting pressure for reasons of economy of scale as well as health, environment and safety improvements to establish more uniform work processes across the many wells they serve.
Quite a few, in line with Garfinkel's (1967) advice, have addressed the time dimension of this relationship: work practices are analysed through processes of learning (Hyysalo 2009; Chu & Robey, 2008) , organisational routines (Feldman and Pentland 2003) or imitation/ isomorphism (Batenburg et al. 2008) . Fewer studies, notably of Enterprise Systems, also exist that focus on the space dimension and how technology mediates (or rather not) the 'same' ('best') practices across distributed sites (Wagner and Newell 2004; Volkoff et al. 2005; Wagner, Scott, & Galliers, 2006) . The purpose of this paper is to contribute towards a theoretical understanding of how 'same' technologically mediated work practices emerge by tracing out the space and time dimensions. We make two contributions.
First, we give a characterisation of how the 'same' technologically mediated, space-separated work practices emerge over time. As "[t] he vector of time has long been recognised" while " [t] he vector of space, in contrast, has remained comparatively undertheorized" (Amin and Cohendet 2004, p. 86) , our analysis starts from technological mediation across space working as a template or plan that over time gets refined, backed up -or defeated. We identify and discuss constituting strategies of (i) differentiation ("what is the unique personality of this oil well?"), (ii) assembling similarities ("how to make simplifications?") and (iii) punctuation ("what happens when simplifications break down?").
Second, we discuss how similar technologically mediated work practices need to be to be the 'same'. Time-space separated work practices clearly cannot literally be the same. We understand 'similar' not as 'same' (i.e. identical) but as 'family 3 resemblance 1 ' (i.e. degree of sameness). The question thus becomes for whom, where and when are work practices similar enough? Family resemblance among work practices is in our analysis not an essentialist quest for certain attributes but rather a performed achievement. We discuss how similar enough is relative to a given purpose framed within political and institutional discourses.
Theory: Practice-based perspectives and beyond

The local
Practice-based perspectives 2 in information systems do not represent a well-defined body of literature but comprise a loosely connected set of theoretical and methodological approaches (Schatzki et al. 2001; Nicolini 2011) . It has been robustly established that technology but create the conditions for -not govern -human encounters with technology (Avgerou and Ciborra, 2004; Boudreau and Robey, 2005; Newell and Wagner, 2006; Orlikowski, 1996 Orlikowski, , 2000 Robey and Boudreau, 1999) . A distinguishing feature of practice-based perspectives is their emphasis on users'
interactions with technology (i.e. work practices) as local (alternatively: situated, contextual, improvised or enacted). The exact formulation of the affinity with the local varies with the theoretical underpinning. Suchman (2007, p. 70) , leaning on a combination of ethnomethodology and science studies, points out that work practice is not predetermined by formal specifications, but instead is contingent and "depends in essential ways on its material and social circumstances". Similarly, from a structuration theory basis, Orlikowski (2000, p.412) underscores the situated, contextual and local nature of a user's interaction as "every encounter with technology is temporally and contextually provisional, and thus there is, in every use, always the possibility of a different structure being enacted".
1 The% notion% of% family% resemblance% was% made% famous% by% Wittgenstein% (1953)% in% his% discussion% about%how%we%learn%the%rules%of%(language)%games.%There%cannot%be%exhaustive%rules%telling%you% when%to%employ%a%rule%due%to%the%problem%of%infinite%regress.%Hence%you%learn%to%recognise%when% similar%(i.e.%family%resemblance)%conditions%for%rules%apply.% 2 % We% use% the% term% broadly% to% cover% information% systems% research% where% the% contextual% conditions% for% work% practices% are% highlighted,% e.g.% with% notions% such% as% appropriation,% practice% lens,% improvisation,% technologyEinEpractice% and% enactment% (see% e.g.%Leonardi% and% Barley% (2010)% for%an%extensive%review).%
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Underscoring of the local in practice-based research has entailed an emphasis on tracing out local contingencies at play in information systems implementation processes (Leonardi & Barley, 2010) . For example, Robey and Sahay (1996) conducted a comparative case study of a geographical information system (GIS) implementation within two government organisations and identified "radically different experiences with, and consequences of, the GIS technology" (ibid., 93). The difference in outcomes of implementation of the same technology was attributed to differences in the local contexts of the two organisations, e.g. the differences in user involvement, management commitment and technological experience.
Another connotation of the local in practice-based perspectives is the malleable character of the technology. From the field of science studies, technology allows 'interpretive flexibility', implying that "for different social groups, the artefact presents itself as essentially different artefacts" (Bijker, 1992, p.76) . Exploring the malleability of technology has been important also in practice-based perspectives in information systems. What practice-based perspectives accomplish well, then, is documenting the inherent space for users' workarounds; there is always leeway for human discretion in encounters with technology (Gasser 1986 ). The 'agentic turn' (Emirbayer and Mische 1998) , which is also influential in practice-based research (Boudreau and Robey 2005) , risks privileging individual over collective action, thereby undermining how practice theory originally was geared towards collective practices (Schatzki et al,. 2001; Bourdieu 1977) . It is not that practice-based perspectives rule out limitations to local discretion as e.g. Orlikowski (2000, p. 409) writes, " [s] aying that use is situated and not confined to predefined options does not mean that is totally open to any and all possibilities". For instance, Boudreau and Robey (2005) explicitly set out to test whether there is room for human discretion in the case of integrated systems and conclude that their results strengthen the practicebased position by "showing that such enactment apply [also] to an ostensibly less flexible technology, an ERP system" (ibid., p. 14).
The meaning of the 'local' in practice-based research has always been a source of misunderstanding. As Nicolini (2011, p. 603) points out, "the practice-based approach is always exposed to the risk of being understood as a call for more close-up micro-studies". The risk, in other words, is that the local is understood too literally as a space-time confined physical location. An overly literal meaning of 'local' would run counter to a fuller understanding of practice-based perspectives (see e.g. 
Non-local: enter space and time
Work practices are local in the sense of being shaped by local social, historical and material circumstances but not local in the sense of being confined in time-space to a particular locale. Conflating the latter with the former creates seemingly 'contradictions' (Pollock et al. 2009, p. 255) , 'puzzles' (Yamauchi and Swanson 2010, p. 188) or as Shapin (1995, p. 307) early put it in the context of the 'artefact' of a scientific fact: "If, as empirical research securely establishes, science is a local product, how does it travel with what seems to be unique efficiency?". How to resolve this contradiction is the subject of ongoing debates in and around information systems research as we outline in discussing three particularly relevant approaches.
One approach is based on insights about standardised (i.e. similar) work practices within science studies. The key is to embed the local into the very notion of standardised practice. For instance, Timmermans and Berg (1997) studied the use of clinical protocols (practices). While the primary aim of the protocols is to transform and standardise work practices, the authors vividly illustrate that the protocols are not universal. Actors perform minor and not-so-minor deviations in order to adjust a given protocol to unforeseen situations. Local tinkering with the protocol, the authors argue, is not a failing of but a prerequisite for the working of the protocol. Local tinkering is inherent as captured by their notion of 'local universalism'. As Berg and Timmermans (2000, p. 45) argue, the local tinkering is inherently implied or embedded as the effort itself of standardisation "produce the very disorder [local tinkering] they attempt to eradicate".
Within information systems research, Vaast and Walsham (2009) are among the few scholars who have tried to draw on the notion of local universalism (see also Monteiro and Rolland 2012) . Vaast and Walsham (2009) In what follows, we operationalise the abstractly formulated strategies of Frodeman (1986) to the work practices of oil and gas well maintenance engineers. We analyse the crafting -temporal and fragile -of similar enough work practices by tracing out the interconnections in space-time of extended situations inspired by Actor-network theory.
Research methods
Case setting, access and selection
Established in the 1970s, the global oil and gas company (OGC, a pseudonym) has grown from a small, regional operator in Northern Europe to a significant energy company, currently employing some 30,000 people with activities in 40 countries across four continents and listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Historically, the units of OGC have been semi-autonomously organised by geography i.e. around the site of the oil field. The OGC has a long history of organising work according to hierarchical models and a strict division of labour. Currently, OGC may be classified as a matrix organisation with business units serving multiple functions. As result, oil and gas production from a given oil and gas field is dependent on a number of 8 different disciplines belonging to different functional units. In addition to internal matrix organising, the OGC is heavily dependent on multiple external vendors and service companies.
Our study focuses on a designated group of engineers doing oil and gas well maintenance (or 'intervention'). The well is drilled deep into the seabed and is largely inaccessible. Well intervention is critically important to mitigate risks to health, environment and commercial interests. Well interventions have traditionally differed significantly from oil field to oil field due to site-specific differences in the geological formations, layout of the production system and level and profile of competence of the offshore workers. As one engineer explained, "every well is unique".
The three authors of this paper have intimate but different knowledge of OGC (Hepsø et al. 2009; Østerlie et al. 2012 ). This paper draws predominantly on the empirical data collected by the second author who has been studied collaborative localised work practices, beyond economic performance, are tied to risks to human life and the environment (Eisenhardt 1989 ).
Data collection
We draw on three types of data collection mainly conducted by the second author:
semi-structured interviews, participatory observations and document studies. We have conducted in total 68 interviews (see Table 1 full days of observation over 6 months at an OGC department at another site. This was particularly important to understand the highly technical professional language of the reservoir, production and well engineers comprising the core of the subsurface community. Participant observations were interleaved, as is common with our type of interpretative case studies, with informal interviews/ conversations over coffee or in the corridor to clarify issues, pose a question that could not be put during a meeting or get brief feedback on observations. The LWI group is located in the same building as 10 the OGP department making access smooth. 7 of the 20 days of observations at the OGP site were devoted to LWI.
25 pages of field notes were taken during the observations. The field notes recorded, as accurately as practically feasible, selected episodes, exchanges and outbursts during everyday work. Alongside these 'raw' empirical data, we maintained notes about question-begging observations, early interpretations or issues we could not understand (which we needed to clarify with the informants later).
We had access to an extensive collection of predominantly electronic but also paper-based documents. These were mainly internal OGC documents on strategies, plans, memos and experience reports related to the collaborative corporate infrastructure. In addition, we analysed the technical descriptions, formal presentations and training materials of various infrastructural components. A number of presentations, governing documents and formal process descriptions related to LWI activities were studied in detail. Finally, we have collected external reports from industry magazines and the media.
Data analysis
In our longitudinal study, data analysis was iterative and ongoing and overlapping with data collection (Boland 2005) . The stages of data analysis are blurred but may, to keep the "inherent creative leap" involved in interpretative research of our kind as transparent as possible (Langley 1999, p. 691) , structured into three stages.
First, we produced a flow-or process-oriented understanding of the sequence, content and resources involved in the LWI: how it was requested, planned, conducted and evaluated. Documentary data was particularly useful here. OGC has an extensive, critics hold almost bureaucratic, set of 'Governing documents' that describe and regulate business processes including well maintenance.
Second, we manually (using colours, annotations, post-it notes) coded transcripts, field notes and documentary data. Our unit of analysis was LWI practices and their relationship rather than actors (Nicolini 2011) . Anything but clean slates (Suddaby 2006) , coding was influenced by our deep knowledge of OGC as well as our theoretical affinity with practice-and process-oriented perspectives including
Actor-network theory (References suppressed for anonymity). Coding was inductive but with important deductive impulses. Coding was in rounds and interleaved with clustering into conceptual categories (see Table 2 ). Early coding identified how and 11 where LWI worked around shortcomings of the procedures of the Governing documentation. For instance, complaining that the formal procedures were too crude, LWI engineers stressed the importance of the specific "history of the well" which subsequently aggregated into our conceptual category of 'biography' of the well.
Partly driven by deductive influences, early coding did not identify when LWI engineers had enough details about the well to proceed. Rather than precise cut-off criteria, our later coding identified strategies employed that worked as heuristic approximations. For instance, we coded instances where LWI engineers relied on the advice of "more experienced" peers. This coding underscored the important of trust in professional networks and aggregated into one of our conceptual categories (cf. Trust in Third, from the derived conceptual categories we developed our interpretative template in the form of three constructs (see first column of Table 2 ). Given our ambitions of characterising performative strategies for how LWI was accomplished, our constructs mirror our effort to condense the richer insights of the working vehicles, the conceptual categories.
---TABLE 2 about here ----
Case
The well
The well is the central object around which exploration, drilling, production, maintenance and process performance evolve. It is a deep, largely inaccessible and highly complex object. Wells vary in length (1000 -5000 meters), direction (previously only vertical, now placed also horizontally), number of well connected to a facility (smaller ones 10-15 wells while larger fields have 70-100 production wells connected) and purpose (injection of gas and/or water to increase reservoir pressure).
Wells are drilled to extract hydrocarbons from a reservoir to the platform where oil . In contrast to topside wells, subsea wells are completed on the seabed. The wellhead of a subsea well is installed on the sea floor and not on the platform (see Figure 1 for an illustration). The daily production from subsea wells is 4 %See%www.oilspillcommission.gov/final-report% 5 % Recognising% the% long% timeEspans% of% technologies% by% using% the% analogy% of% a% 'biography'% is% borrowed%from%Pollock%and%Williams%(2009).% 6 % A% wellhead% is% a% part% of% a% well,% which% terminates% at% the% surface% where% hydrocarbons% can% be% withdrawn.% The% wellhead% consists% of% multiple% devices% that% operate% the% well% and% ensure% production%control.%% 7 % 'Easily'% accessible% oil% has% already% been% located.% The% remainder% is% increasingly% inaccessible,% involving% more% elaborate% and% complex% subsea% technologies.% An% estimated% 25%% of% the% world's% remaining%oil%reserves%are%in%the%Arctic%with%severe%environmental%and%weather%challenges.% 8 %The%vision%of%both%oil%companies%and%vendors%is%to%have%complete%production%plants%subsea.% 13 from remote (onshore or on neighbouring platforms) control centres based on the instrument readings from the subsea installation.
----INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE ----OGC has strategically targeted subsea wells as the present and planned fields are difficult/ costly to run from top-side wells. Investing heavily since the 1980s, OCG is currently among the global pioneers of subsea wells. OGC operates around 500 subsea wells. On the Norwegian Continental shelf, over 60% of OGC's oil and gas production is currently from subsea wells. This percentage is expected to increase in as "there is a gradual transfer from installations projecting above the sea surface to subsea installations" (OGC intranet news, October 2009). The focus of this paper is on subsea wells and their maintenance.
Well maintenance (or 'intervention')
Subsea wells consist of multiple technological components such as sensors, valves, casing, tubing equipment and electronic control units (see Figure 2 ). These components are in themselves complex, technological devices obviously not infallible. The components of a subsea well are exposed to severe environmental stress. At different rates, they all decay e.g. from corrosion or sand production (see Figure 3 for illustration). An instant increase in sand production may damage sensor within hours or days. The purpose of well interventions is to maintain the technical integrity of the well to mitigate against health, environmental and/or commercial risks and increase production performance. Unplanned shutting down production due to lacking maintenance represent significant economic damage to OGC from lost revenues and large fixed costs (equipment, personnel).
----INSERT FIGURES 2 and 3 ABOUT HERE ----Well interventions mainly repair or replace selected components of the subsea well. Wells can fill with sand and needs 'washing' by injecting chemicals into the well at designated pressure. Many of subsea well interventions are due to 'scale'.
Scale consists mainly of inorganic salts that have elements of calcium carbonates, barium and strontium sulphates. The production tubing gets clogged from scale that severely hampers the flow of hydrocarbons in the well. Scale typically develops when reservoir formation water (i.e. water contained inside the reservoir) enters the well. This happens continually the whole year round… if the vessel is parked in the docks, we loose money… (LWI engineer)
Light well intervention (LWI)
The key challenge for LWI is -drawing on relevant knowledge of involved actors, digging into available documentation about the well and its equipment, an understanding of the reservoir, consulting the production engineer triggering the LWI and the control room of the platform -to grasp the particular issues of the well in question and conduct a sufficiently safe planning and execution of the intervention.
LWI is premised on the assumption it can be conducted without insight into the fullfledged biography of the well. For LWI engineers the question is how, where and when simplifications in their work practices are made. 
Analysis
Differentiation: identifying the profile of the well
As most safety-critical organisations, OGC has an extensive set of 'Governing documents' regulating its principal business processes such as exploration, drilling, project development, production, -and well interventions. Governing documents lay out the structure of the process as well as required input to and format of output from these processes. One document template is the so-called 'Well Intervention
Assignment' outlining the type of intervention planned together with production and reservoir information. During a 'start-up' meeting, the production engineers present the Well Intervention Assignment to the well engineers, thus initiating LWI.
As is by now well-known, formal work descriptions and templates for LWI, to be applied for all wells uniformly, do not of course govern the work practices but rather act as resources, checklists or a point of departure. In the everyday practices of LWI, a primary strategy is to conjure from resources, including but not restricted to those in the templates, a 'profile' or differentiation of the special characteristics of the well in question. We illustrate.
A central part of LWI's effort to grasp the uniqueness of the well -its
personality -is to re-construct historically the biography of the well. In stark contrast to topside well interventions, LWI have little prior, local knowledge of the well. On the rare occasions they do have prior experience with the well, "we believe the quality improves" as one LWI engineer stated. Engineers with in-depth, historical understanding of the well conduct topside well interventions. This is exactly what LWI needs to re-create, if not in full, at least sufficiently for the intervention. This reconstruction takes time: the planning of topside well interventions typically takes less than a week whereas LWI planning takes more than a month.
There is truly an abundance of data constituting the full biography of the well.
To illustrate, during the drilling phase alone, more than a thousand documents may be produced for a single well. For subsea wells, the target of LWI, there is in addition real-time data from instrument readings of pressure (see Figure 4) , fluid flow rate, temperature, vibration, composition, fluid hold-up and electromagnetic resistance.
One subsea well will typically have about 5-10 sensors.
--FIGURE 4 about here --- The reason why we spend so much time searching for previous experience is to assess whether it is at all possible to conduct a specific intervention.
Earlier experience could indicate specific failures that would prohibit us from doing an intervention. Rather than discovering this when we are onboard the vessel, we find this 1 or 2 months before the operation. For instance, recently we discovered that the control system on the x-mas tree [equipment installed on the sea floor, cf. Working out a profile for the well, then, always involves sifting, sampling and simplifying from the (overly) rich, full biography of the well.
Assembling similarities: patching together a working understanding
Well interventions are usually performed several years, even decades, after the well was drilled and completed. As pointed out, data related to the well accumulate into vast data sets. Multiple subsurface disciplines work with specific aspects of a well and during distinct phases of well's lifecycle. Every discipline in the subsea community to deliver or manufacture certain equipment, or provide reliable information about the exact configuration of the equipment. Close collaboration with vendors is required in order to make sure that a vessel is loaded with the correct equipment to perform a certain intervention effectively.
Punctuation: break-downs and anomalies
The strategies of LWI practices covered above involve getting the planning off the ground in the first place and subsequently making it more robust. Despite a month of planning, LWIs experience (small and not so small) anomalies. To facilitate a close link between LWI planning and execution, the intervention is always supervised by an LWI engineer onboard the vessel. The intervention is performed by representatives of the vendors of the subsea well equipment in question also onboard the vessel. Daily videoconferences are held between the LWI engineer onboard and those onshore.
Usually the LWI engineer responsible for the planning of the given intervention is the one participating from the onshore end of these videoconferences.
That anomalies emerge following LWI planning is not surprising. LWI engineers work with objects they have hardly examined closely (physically) before.
Their understandings, as described earlier, rely on vast historic and real-time data, consultations with both external partners and OGC colleagues. Yet accuracy and completeness of information of wells varies, thus well interventions inherently involve risks.
Well engineers learn how to cope and improvise with aberrant wells over time.
During an intervention, for instance, it is crucial to ensure that the equipment connected to the vessel is at the right depth. In one engineer's words, you need to know "where you are in the well". To ensure depth control, well engineers require detailed, updated information about the installed pipes. Lack of this information does not imply that an intervention cannot be performed:
If we do not have certain information it means more uncertainty. If we do not know the length of pipes and how they are connected, we can do some workarounds. We can identify depth in several ways. We could use connection locator, which marks where a given pipe begins and were it ends. Alternatively, we could measure relative to the formation. So usually, we find a way out. (LWI engineer) Even 'straightforward' cases create dramatic anomalies:
We made damages to a well during an intervention. We injected liquid into the well, but pumped too much, which subsequently increased the pressure causing the production tubing to collapse. We had to leave the well and a [mobile] rig had to be acquired to fix the well. (LWI engineer)
Coping with anomalies through learning over time about a specific well is necessary but not sufficient. Learning from anomalies across wells is also required. 12 were discussed. First, they decided to revise add an item to the existing checklist to check the riser specifically. Still not able to cope satisfactory, a later meeting decided on a protocol applicable to all wells in the assets for how the "riser shall be monitored with respect to fatigue life".
Discussion
Charactering the crafting of similarities
Our concern is more targeted than observing that there exist relationships between work practices. We analyse the specific relationship of similarity: how does similarity in work practices get crafted?
In a study of how Enterprise Systems acquire their similarity -their ability to be packaged to serve multiple client organisations - Pollock et al. (2007) Coping with anomalies is not merely about in situ improvisations or accumulated learning from a specific well. This would effectively turn anomalies into a re-dressed version of practice theory. Crucial to our analysis is how anomalies from one well are made visible, thus potentially relevant, to other wells. Local anomalies feed an ongoing process of identifying family resemblance of anomalies across wells.
This takes place through a combination of formal documents and institutionalised arenas/ meetings. Responses to anomalies are accordingly not handled (only) there and then, but get gradually sedimented into documents, checklists and routines.
Significant anomalies need to be documented in a given system supervised by the National petroleum authority and are subject to nationally regulated audits. Smaller anomalies are documented in the Final well report. Patterns of similar anomalies are discussed in institutionalised arenas of well engineers from several assets and typically result in revised checklists and routines. LWI, especially for complex wells (high pressure and/ or temperature, history of incidents), have institutionalised 'peer review' processes as laid out by Governing documentation. A peer review process assembles a team of production and reservoir engineers to review documentation.
The pragmatism and politics of family resemblances
Starting from templates (uniform across space), LWI engineers develop a fragile, contingent, definitely fallible 'working knowledge' of the well, its personality and resemblance with related wells that allow similar enough LWI work practices. As the US Government appointed commission following the Deepwater Horizon blow-out in Second, the question of similarity becomes a pragmatic one. Pragmatism has attracted some interest in IS research 13 but scholars have tended to pursue other aspects such as conceptual modelling (Ågerfalk, 2010) and action research (Sjöström & Goldkuhl, 2009 ). "Pragmatics", notes Giere (2004, p. 742 ) "has been largely a catchall for whatever is left over, but seldom systematically investigated". Rather than a fixed criterion, the crafting of similarity is inherently linked with the intentionality/ purpose of the work practice. The directedness of practical activities or in the words of Orr (1996, p. 6 , emphasis in original), "The first and foremost goal of practice…is getting the job done", pragmatism shares with another crucial underpinning of practice theory, viz. phenomenology (Idhe 2001) . For instance, in filling in the risk matrix for a well as part of the planning, the focus is to categorise the risk profile of the well, not capture its biography in full. This risk profile directs the type and extent of preparations for the LWI engineers 'to get the job done'.
Third, similarities in work practices are learnt over time (Chu and Robey 2008; Yamauchi and Swanson 2010 (Weick and Sutcliffe 2001) . A vivid illustration of how safety is tied to concerns for similarities in work practices is the gas leakage problems OGC experienced at one of its fields in 2010. In the Governmental audit conducted after the incidents and subsequent shutdown, the main conclusion was that a disaster in the magnitude of Deepwater Horizon could have happened "under marginally different circumstances" 14 . The thrust of the audit's critique was OGC's apparently lacking ability to establish similar work practices for planning, production and maintenance across is oil and gas fields, including OGC's lacking ability to draw out the relevant similarities in wells separated in time and space. National petroleum authorities and OGC management want to move away from the traditional, local work practices to establish stronger similarities across space and time. In short, the ongoing efforts to establish more similar work practices across space-time is not only about 'learning from experience' -nobody opposes that -but a highly political issue involving the unions and management of OGC in addition to being framed within a national and international institutional and regulatory regime.
Conclusion
In the context of processes of globalisation, Appadurai (1996) makes the observation that theorising lags significantly behind the empirically, unfolding phenomenon. This is not unlike the situation we are analysing. Business and public organisations have invested heavily to establish distributed yet uniform work practices, e.g. by introducing Enterprise Systems. As practice-based research makes clear, achieving identical ('best') work practices is unattainable. Still, had not managers, owners and investors after two decades of Enterprise Systems also recognised an interesting level of similarities in work practices, surely they would have fallen out of fashion? It seems to us that the unfolding, empirical phenomenon of technologically mediated efforts to promote similar work practices has yet to receive an adequate theoretical account in information systems research.
In our use the notion of family resemblance is performative, pragmatic and political. Resonating with Wittgenstein's (1953) original insights, family resemblance of work practices is not about sharing certain attributes. Similarity is performed or crafted through the strategies we have discussed. The criterion for when sufficient similarity is achieved is pragmatic in the sense of directed or intentional. The filling in of a 2 x 2 risk matrix directs attention to those similarities that matter for the planning of the LWI (e.g. type of equipment to bring along). Moreover, the crafting of similarity is political. This is especially evident around issues of safety and risk.
Whether compliance to uniform work practices improves safety, or whether safe operations and maintenance are better served by practices shaped by the local circumstances of the well, is discussed heatedly between OGC management and unions as well as national authorities.
Family resemblance of work practices is relevant to many organisations for reasons of economic performance, quality of service and safety to human life and the environment. A key practical implication from our study is that the crafting of family resemblance is ongoing and emergent rather than about nailing the exact balance between uniformity and localised work practices. More specifically, our study show the importance of flexibly stepping up the degree of formalism and amount of resources in response to number, frequency and type of anomaly. As anomalies increase in gravity, so do the number of people, amount of time spent, format for deliberation/ arena and degree of formal documentation. Rather than a fixed, institutional response, a dynamically modulated response relative to the gravity of the anomalies is required. Oil and Gas Production (OGP) 22
Light well intervention (LWI) department 9
Total number of interviews 68 Unplanned events "Recently we discovered that the control system of the x-mas tree [cf. [equipment] into the well" "We injected liquid into the well, but pumped too much…causing the production tubing to collapse" Table 2 . Interpretative constructs, conceptual categories and excerpts underpinning our data analysis.
